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Priority (15)

Defendants and Appellees.
Plaintiff replies to the Brief of Appellees, James T.
Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen (hereinafter "Jensens"), as
follows

(the other defendants are referred to herein as "the

Corporate defendant and Killion"):
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF CORPORATION RETAINS ITS CORPORATE

EXISTENCE AND POWERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROTECTING AND DISPOSING OF
ITS ASSETS WITHOUT TIME LIMITATION.
The Jensens' argument is a simple one:

Plaintiff was

dissolved in 1965 and is now legally dead and cannot sue to protect
its assets because as they state at page 22 of their brief "30
years Is Too Long for a Corporation to 'Wind Up7 Its Affairs."
In so stating Jensens appear to agree with plaintiff that
the rule in Utah in accordance with the Utah statutes and cases, is

that a dissolved corporation retains title to its assets and can
sue to protect them. Apparently Jensens take the position that if
the corporation takes too long in winding up its affairs that the
assets cease to belong to the corporation and pass automatically to
the shareholders as tenants in common.
The trouble with this position is that there is no
support for it in the law, and it would be a bad rule.
Jensens

cite no case

law

supporting

the

foregoing

proposition. Jensens do cite as authority for their position, two
cases from other jurisdictions, Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265, 281
P.2d 483 (1955) ; and Kirby Royalties. Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 461 P.2d
282 (Wyo. 1969).

These cases held that the assets of dissolved

corporation pass immediately upon dissolution to the shareholders.
That position is directly contrary to the Utah statute and cases
interpreting it.
Jensens cite as additional authority for their position
three cases from other jurisdictions, Levy v. Lieblincr, 238 F.2d
505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert, denied, 353 U. S. 936; Jenot v. White
Mountain Acceptance Corp. . 124 N.H. 701, 474 A.2d 1382 (1984); and
Hampton v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co.. 107 N.H. 89, 218 A.2d 442
(1966).

These cases all held that the assets of the dissolved

corporation pass to the shareholders not upon dissolution, but
rather upon the expiration of the relevant 2 or 3 year winding up
statute.

If Utah had a winding up statute with a time limitation,

those case might be persuasive, but that is not the case.
Utah's winding up statute was without any time limitation
-2-

and was found at Sec, 16-10-101 UCA:
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation...the
corporate
existence
of
such
corporation
shall
nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up its
affairs in respect to any property and assets which have
not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to
such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah also had a separate 2 year survival of remedy
statute which is found at Sec. 16-10-100 UCA which provided:
"The dissolution of a corporation...shall not take away
or impair any remedy available to or against the
corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders,
for any right or claim existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other
proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after
the date of such dissolution.
Any such action or
proceeding by or against the corporation may be
prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its
corporate name..."
If winding up under Sec. 16-10-101 UCA were in some way
limited to the two year period of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA, there would
be no need for Sec. 16-10-101 UCA.

The two sections were clearly

not intended to be repetitious.

Sec. 16-10-100 UCA speaks of

remedies by or against the corporation relating to a "right or
claim existing" or "liability incurred" "prior" to dissolution.
Sec. 16-10-101 speaks in terms of the "property and assets" of the
dissolved corporation.

It appears clear that Sec. 16-10-100 UCA

was intended to deal with claims and liabilities arising before
dissolution and existing between the corporation and third parties.
-3-

It appears that Sec. 16-10-101 UCA was intended to deal with the
with

issues of property

and assets of the corporation

(and

specifically allowing the corporation to sue and be sued with
regard thereto without limitation of time), and thus appears to
have been intended to relate to matters (1) between the corporation
and its shareholders as well as

(2) to third party claims and

liabilities (relating to said assets and property) arising after
dissolution.

The interpretation appears to be supported fully by

the current version of said Sec. 16-10-100 UCA which appears to be
set forth in Sections 16-10a-1406 and 1407 UCA.

(These sections

establish two survival of remedy time periods, one of 120 days and
another of 5 years, depending upon the kind of notice given.) The
foregoing interpretation also seems to be borne out by Holman v.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. 905 P.2d 895 (Utah App 1995) which
dealt with a claim arising after dissolution, and not with an asset
owned by the dissolved corporation at dissolution.
Jensens appear to agree that the 2 year survival of
remedy statute is not a winding up statute.

Although Jensens at

page 28 of their brief, argue that title to the subject property
passed to the shareholders immediately upon dissolution or at the
expiration of the 2 year statute, at page 23 of their brief they
concede that Sec. 16-10-101 UCA extends beyond the 2 year period of
Sec. 16-10-100, if the activity relates to "winding up."
Thus even the Jensens admit that the Utah 2 year survival
statute does not trigger any automatic conveyance of corporate
-4-

assets to the shareholders, and the foregoing out-of-state cases
are clearly not in point•
Jensens appear to take the position that the automatic
transfer of assets comes some time later - apparently after the
corporation has had a "reasonable" opportunity to "wind up" its
affairs.
The

notion that we need

a court-created

automatic

transfer of assets to the shareholders after a reasonable winding
up period is fallacious for at least the following reasons:
1. NO STATUTORY OR CASE SUPPORT. There appears to be no
statutory

or case support therefore

in this jurisdiction or

elsewhere.
2. VESTING TITLE IN SHAREHOLDERS AT A FIXED TIME CREATES
CONFUSION.

In our original brief we itemize numerous problems

inherent in vesting title to corporate assets in the shareholders,
for example numerous shareholders resulting in numerous tenants in
common would

be a nightmare.

shareholders cannot be minimized.

Also the problem

of missing

Shareholders may have moved

without forwarding addresses, or died, or even worse the stock may
have become street stock.

Shall we adopt a policy that these

missing persons shall be declared tenants in common?
3. VESTING TITLE IN SHAREHOLDERS AT AN UNCERTAIN TIME IS
EVEN WORSE.

Any scheme that vests the title to assets in the

shareholders whether early or late, simply creates confusion and
uncertainty.

Introducing an additional time element only makes it
-5-

worse.

Shall the courts legislate a time?

reasonable winding up period?

Shall it be after a

Shall the time be the same for all

cases or shall it depend on the facts of the case?

If the court

arbitrarily picks a time applicable to all cases, is that not
judicial legislation?

If vesting in the shareholders depends upon

the facts of the case, no one will ever be able to deal with the
assets of such a corporation with any assurance in the absence of
a lawsuit.

Shall we deal with the dissolved corporation or shall

be deal with the shareholders?

In each case, until a court has

ruled on what a reasonable period of time is with respect to a
particular corporation, no one will ever know if it is safe to deal
with

the corporation

of

if one must deal with

all

of the

shareholders, and they cannot all be found, then what?
Reasonableness of winding up may be an issue of law as
claimed by Jensens if the facts are not in dispute.

In this case

the facts behind winding up are not only disputed, they have never
been presented.

A question of fact exists here which precludes

summary judgment in any event.
4.

THE UTAH STATUTORY PROVISION PROVIDING THAT THE

ASSETS REMAIN IN THE CORPORATION WITHOUT LIMITATION OF TIME IS
BEST.

The Utah legislature and cases interpreting our statutes

have clearly favored the view the corporation retains its assets
without limitation of time.

The current provision found at Sec.

16-10a-1405 UCA couldn't be more explicit in stating that a
dissolved

corporation

retains

its

-6-

assets.

It

states

in

subparagraph (2) that
fa)

"Dissolution of a corporation does not;

transfer title to the corporations property".

limitation of time.

There is no

Although the earlier statute was not as

explicit perhaps, nevertheless the same rule is clearly inherent in
the former statute found at Sec. 16-10-101 UCA which gave the
corporation power to "sell or otherwise dispose of such property
and assets."

It thereby clearly spelled out that the corporation

retains title to its assets. If the shareholders became tenants in
common of the property, then the corporation would not have power
to sell or dispose of the assets, that power would be in the
shareholders. As noted in our original brief the said statute was
thus

interpreted

by

the Utah

Supreme

Court

in

Falconaero

Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395
P2d 915 (1964), and McKay & Knobel Enter., Inc. v. Teton Van Gas,
Inc. , 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969).

Jensens attempt to

distinguish Falconaero by claiming that perhaps it occurred within
the 2 years period of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA. Had that been the fact,
or had the court wished to somehow limit Sec. 16-10-101 UCA by the
2 year provision of Sec. 16-10-100 UCA, it could surely have done
so«

Since the court did neither, it is improper at this time to

try to do so retroactively.
We believe the position adopted by our legislature is the
correct one, the only one that really makes sense, and the only one
that brings any stability to titles. The corporation must be able
to. retain title to its assets, and it must be able to dispose of
-7-

them and protect them until they are disposed of, no matter when
that may occur.

If the corporation is dilatory in this, if it is

acting improperly in any way, the shareholders can certainly sue
the corporation for relief.
5.

THE

CURRENT

APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

STATUTE

SEC.

16-10a-1405

UCA

IS

Not only does the current statute only

restate what has been our law, but the current statute, by its own
terms, appears to be applicable to this case. Sec. 16-10a-1701 UCA
provides that the Chapter 10a of Title 16 (and therefore Sec. 1610a-1405 UCA) applies "to all domestic corporations in existence on
July 1. 1992." (Emphasis added.) For the reasons stated above, we
believe that plaintiff was "in existence" on July 1, 1992, for the
purposes of disposing of its assets.
The rule contended for by defendant is without support in
the law and is impractical and unworkable.
POINT 2. A FACT ISSUE ON FRAUD EXISTS PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Jensens attempted to influence the court below that
plaintiff's claim

is without merit

in any case because the

shareholders gave quit claim deeds - so no harm done even if the
court rules against plaintiff for an erroneous reason.

Plaintiff

claimed below that the deeds were invalid and were obtained by
fraud. The lower court made no ruling on this matter, but may have
been influenced in its ruling nevertheless.
The Jensens have attempted the same tactic here.
-8-

They

have devoted a good part of their brief to the matter of the quit
claim deeds.
At page 27 of their brief, Jensens appear to complain
that plaintiff has not enlightened anyone about the quit claim deed
fraud as claimed by them.

On a motion for summary judgment and

upon the state of the record, plaintiff's allegation of fraud must
be taken as true, and a further delineation thereof at this stage
is not necessary. Nevertheless, plaintiff has no problem in going
further and the substance of plaintiff's claims in this regard is
as follows:
Jensens
shareholders

and

through

their

obtained

agents

said

sought

quit

out

claim

the
deeds

said
by

misrepresentation of the fact that the said shareholders did not
own any interest in the subject Amis No. 1 claim, and that
therefore there was no harm in giving the deeds.

Grantors were

paid $25.00 each for their trouble, notwithstanding the said mining
claim is a very valuable claim.

If Jensens meant by their

representations that the shareholders had no interest in Amis No.
1 as it was owned by the corporation,
no fraud perhaps.

then there would have been

But it would be highly fraudulent for them to

claim that the shareholders had no interest in the property (in the
sense that the corporation owned the claim) and to now claim that
the shareholders really owned it after all. In fact, Jensens knew
that plaintiff (or its shareholders) owned the property.
Thereafter, the corporate defendant and Killion through
-9-

their agents approached plaintiff to acquire said claims and
advised that the tracts in question had never been deeded out of
plaintiff.

Plaintiff was unaware of that fact until then.

That

was therefore the first they knew that they had been defrauded by
Jensens.
For their part, the corporate defendant and Killion got
the record title changed by obtaining and recording a deed from a
totally separate corporation having the name "Salt Lake Investment
Company," and since the recorder was unaware that it was the wrong
Salt Lake Investment Company changed the ownership on the record.
This later Salt Lake Investment Company owned nothing regarding the
three claims and could give nothing.
Admittedly the foregoing is the position of plaintiff,
and plaintiff and all defendants should have their day in court on
these issues, and that is the very purpose of this action to quiet
title to the subject claims in an action naming all of the parties
and to thus have a court of law pass on these allegations once and
for all.

This entire endeavor has been improperly thwarted.
POINT 3.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND,

AND NO FORMAL MOTION TO AMEND WAS NECESSARY.
The

decision

of the

lower court

acknowledges

that

plaintiff had the right to wind up, but apparently the thinking of
the lower court was that there could be no fact situation that
would allow a dissolved corporation to go to court relating to any
act of winding up after 30 years.
-10-

Jensens argued in the lower court as they do here that
the assets passed to the shareholders. The lower court did not so
rule.

This creates a dilemma:
A.

If the lower court felt that time barred plaintiff's

action but that the shareholders did not receive title, then it was
perhaps correct in not allowing plaintiff to amend.

But if

plaintiff cannot sue or be sued under Sec. 16-10-101 UCA because of
the lapse of time, then is not plaintiff also barred from selling
or otherwise disposing of its assets because the right to dispose
of its assets is also covered under said Sec. 16-10-101 UCA.
It makes little sense to say the dissolved corporation
can deed its properties or give a disclaimer to clarify title or
whatever and then to say it cannot sue.
If a dissolved corporation can sell its assets, but
cannot sue, then what if it sells its assets on time, and the buyer
defaults. Cannot the corporation sue on the note? or foreclose if
necessary?

If plaintiff can't transfer its assets what is to

become of them?
B.

On the other hand if the lower court felt that the

assets passed to the shareholders, then the court should have
allowed plaintiff to amend to join them.
Jensens claim in a footnote at page 12 of their brief
that plaintiff did not make a formal motion to amend.

It was and

still is plaintiff's position that the assets of plaintiff belong
to plaintiff and not to the shareholders, and that plaintiff can
-11-

sue to defend its assets at any time. Plaintiff therefore did not
want to amend as a first choice and did not think it necessary to
formally so move to amend. The motion to amend was an alternative
position, and therefore no formal motion to amend was made.

The

matter was clearly raised below, and this court should look to
substance over form.
POINT 4. FAILURE TO GRANT ORAL ARGUMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL.
At page 12 of their brief, Jensens assert that plaintiff
has not shown that lack of oral argument would have brought about
a different result. That is not plaintiff's constitutional burden,
anymore than it would be for a person wrongfully denied a jury
trial, to prove that a jury had he been allowed one would have
acquitted him.

If one has a right to oral argument then one has a

right to it without condition or excuse.

The reasons for oral

argument are numerous, but not the least is the right to attempt to
convince the judge emotionally as well as intellectually in a face
to face exchange.

It is presumed that such an exchange is

beneficial.
It is true that if this court finds that plaintiff's
position is correct on the law, and this court reverses, the
omission of oral argument will be corrected. But still the proper
processes of the law should have be followed to minimize the
expense of appeals.
Finally, in matters involving lower court discretion
adversely effecting an appellant, oral argument is an essential
-12-

part of the exercise of that discretion.

If the appellate court

finds abuse of discretion in such a case, presumably that would
correct the error, but to affirm the exercise of lower court
discretion

in

absence

of mandated

oral

argument

is clearly

improper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment of the
District Court as it relates to Jensens and the corporate defendant
and Killion should be reversed, and this action remanded for trial
on all issues and as to all parties.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument of this
appeal.
Dated this &> day of July, 1996.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
and Appellant
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Two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants
were mailed to each of the following at the address shown, postage
prepaid, the

&

day of July, 1996:

Derek Langton
Attorney for Defendants Jensen
201 South Main, Suite 1800
P. 0. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr.
Attorney for the Corporate Defendant and Killion,
Mountain Fuel East Professional Plaza
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7
P. 0. Box 67
Payson, Utah 84651-0067.
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Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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